History and Traditions, Foundation Stones or Stumbling Blocks?

Disclaimer: Another little piece I started writing, got excited that it might be published, and was turned down.  To be fair, the intended publication didn't allow for the length needed--I didn't have enough space to flesh out all the thoughts (tying aviation to the MAGTF and some other things).   This really was more about telling those folks who are deriding the possible decisions of the CMC (in this case, the possible closures of the recruit depots) that there is a larger tradition at work here, and being tied to the past strictly for the sake of the past isn't it. So here's what I think about the real tradition of the Marine Corps.  Sorry, no pictures.

History and Traditions, Foundation Stones or Stumbling Blocks?

One cannot argue that there are major changes afoot in the Marine Corps; the deactivation of the tank battalions, reorganization of Training and Education Command into a Lieutenant General billet, and the possible closures of the current recruit depots in favor of a singular location spring to mind.  In fact, on 25 October 2020, “Marine Corps Times” posted a story about this very topic.  In the Marine Corps Times Facebook post, commentors argued that it was the death of the Corps to close these recruit depots and it was a destruction of “Core [sic] foundations.” These arguments are the misuse of history and traditions.  It’s true, history (and historians) can't help you with the technology or budget issues, but the things the Corps is going through aren't new, and looking to the past can be useful at a time such as this.  In a service that prides itself on honoring its past, the use of history and traditions alone may do more to stimy forward progress than propel it. Yet, history and traditions are at the heart of the Marine Corps and the question to close one, or both, of the recruit depots.  With that in mind, what if the Corps’ leadership asked themselves the following questions:  How did the leadership deal with possible disbandment in the early 20th century? How did new technology change the nature of warfare, particularly the airplane?  Was it strictly tradition they followed, or did their predecessors follow the tradition of change?

First, the matter of the history of the location of the recruit depots themselves must be examined and placed in the proper historical context.  As outlined in the official brief history of recruit training, For more than 100 years, recruits have been trained at Parris Island (formerly Port Royal) and for 98 years at San Diego.  However, for more than 135 years, recruit training was primitive and decentralized; it was performed by non-commissioned officers at various locations across the Marine Corps.  Recruits were trained simply in the “principles of military movement” and how to use a rifle.  This was the tradition for those first 135 years—for the majority of the Marine Corps’ history, recruits were NOT trained at Parris Island or San Diego. 

But in 1911, Major General Commandant William P. Biddle established the requirement that all recruits complete two months training at one of the four newly created recruit depots—Philadelphia, Norfolk, Puget Sound and Mare Island.  It wasn’t long before these locations were consolidated into single depots on each coast—Mare Island and Port Royal (Parris Island).  The training program Biddle outlined included drill, physical exercise, personal combat, and intensive marksmanship qualification with the recently-adopted M1903 Springfield rifle.  The implementation of a Corps-wide training curricula, at two centralized locations minimized irregularities, and produced more uniform Marines, each with the same skills and abilities. 

These changes came at a critical time for the Marine Corps. The second decade of the 20th century stretched the Marine Corps’ capabilities and manpower as never before. In 1914, the Marines deployed to Vera Cruz, Mexico; in 1915, the 1st Brigade with two regiments was deployed to Haiti; in 1916, the 2d Brigade was deployed to the Dominican Republic.  By the time the United States entered the First World War on 6 April 1917, there were Marines in the Caribbean, China, Philippines, Guam and Cuba, and many more gearing up for combat in France.  Masses of new Marines were needed, and the recruit depots at Parris Island (renamed from Port Royal to the erroneous Paris Island in 1917) and Mare Island were expanded to meet the need. 

 Changes were well underway on the west coast when the US entered WWI, partly because of the events south of the border.  The official history of the San Diego recruit depot states: “Only 12 miles north of the Mexican border and possessed of an excellent harbor, the city [San Diego] readily recommended itself to the strategic eye as an expeditionary base on the west coast when the need for such a base became evident in the early twentieth century. San Diego was not only convenient to the Pacific approaches of Latin America, but it could also serve advantageously as a port of embarkation the Far East. Concrete action toward establishing a base there, however, awaited some precipitating event. Mexican political instability was to provide the catalyst that returned the Marines to San Diego for the first time since the Mexican War and subsequently caused a permanent Marine Corps post to be established there.”  Camp Howard, on North Island, was established in July 1914 with the arrival of the 4th Regiment under Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton after standing off the coast of Mexico for possible landing in Vera Cruz.

Operations shifted from Camp Howard to the mainland on 11 December 1914.  Eight days later, Colonel Pendleton proclaimed the establishment of Marine Barracks San Diego.  The Marines were well-entrenched at San Diego; the favorable location grew in size and importance into a west coast facility for expeditionary forces to organize and train, in the same model as that of Marine Barracks Philadelphia on the east coast.  In 1923, the recruit depot at Mare Island relocated to San Diego.  While the official history published in 1962 does not indicate why it was relocated, the growing importance of the location at San Diego possibly had something to do with the decision.

 Port Royal, South Carolina, as recorded in the official history of the depot, was initially a Navy facility guarded by Marines as early as 1891 and slowly grew to a full barracks by 1909.  Two years later, a recruit depot and an officers’ school were established at the location; however, this was short-lived as the depot and school were relocated to Norfolk, Virginia, in 1911, and the facility reorganized into a Navy disciplinary installation.  This too was temporary, for in 1915 the recruit depot returned to Port Royal, where it remains today.  Again, the official history does not indicate why the relocation took place; it is possible that the facility at Norfolk was simply inadequate. 

 As demonstrated by the creation of the recruit depots and their expanded instruction, the Corps was taking into account the changing times and flexing itself to meet the needs. The strength of the Marine Corps does not rely solely on traditions and history, rather also includes the ability to adapt and overcome.  The history of the Corps is replete with such reevaluation and redirection, which time proved to be the wisest decisions for the service.  In his 1993 history The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898, noted Corps historian Jack Shulimson outlined the doldrums of the 19th century that left the Marine Corps vulnerable to obsolescence and possible disbandment; these dark days left impressions on the future leaders such as John A. Lejeune.  In the decade before World War I, Lejeune witnessed the necessity to pivot the Marine Corps away from duty as Navy guards, ships snipers and occasional landing parties, and embraced the Advanced Base Force concept (ABF).  Initially dismissed by Marine leadership unwilling to change with the times, the concept established the mission that the Marine Corps would serve as the Navy’s expeditionary force to assist the fleet in seizing and defending advanced bases.  Upon his ascendency to Major General Commandant in 1921, Lejeune embraced this concept and modified it further into the amphibious warfare doctrine studied and practiced through the 1920s and 30s; the final exam being the successes of World War II Pacific operations.  Through Lejeune’s acceptance and expansion of the ABF concept, the Corps was no longer relegated to ad hoc landing parties, or sentinels of unruly sailors; Lejeune had put the Marine Corps on equal footing and in partnership with the Navy.

 Another such rejection of the status quo was the addition of aviation to the arsenal of the Marine Corps, traditionally recorded as the day that First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham arrived at Annapolis for training as a naval aviator on 22 May 1912.   Before Cunningham began his campaign of requests for assignment to aviation training, the Marine Corps was not interested in aviation.  Only after the Major General Commandant tired of Cunningham’s relentless requests was the younger Marine assigned to Annapolis.  The first chapter of the official history of early Marine Corps aviation demonstrates how it expanded over the course of the next five years, and again, it was only the urging, insisting and cajoling of Cunningham that saw the First Marine Aviation Force’s deployment to combat in France during World War I.  Even upon arrival, it was only Cunningham’s firm and swift action saved the Corps’ fliers from becoming behind-the-front cargo pilots for the Army when their own aircraft were lost in transit. 

Through the four months that Marines flew in combat over the Western Front, it was Cunningham that drove them forward and ensured their successes, accumulating a record of 126 flights, in which two Marines earned the Medal of Honor, four earned the Distinguished Service Medal and 16 were awarded the Navy Cross for their actions.  The fliers also learned the most crucial skill of Marine aviators—support of the ground forces through such actions as the first aerial resupply of infantry on 2 October 1918.   In his 1920 Marine Corps Gazette article “The Value of Aviation to the Marine Corps,” Cunningham extolled the virtues of aviation to a skeptical Marine Corps based on the lessons of his experiences in the First World War, lessons such as aerial resupply. Cunningham asserted that the only reason for aviation was the assistance of the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions. 

As well demonstrated in Wray Johnson’s Biplanes at War: US Marine Corps Aviation in the Small Wars Era, 1915-1934, it was in the proving grounds of Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua during the 1920s and 1930s that Marine Corps leadership realized the value of aviation as foretold by Cunningham.  During the “Banana Wars” the Marine aviators learned many of the skills needed to win World War II—close air support, and aerial resupply were expanded and mastered.  Marine aviation went from an unwanted, and little understood capability, to become a critical skill and necessary must-have in every clime and place Marines operate today.  While aviation was not an overnight revelation to Corps leaders, it slowly integrated itself into nearly every aspect of Marine operations—direct combat (air-to-air), combat support, and in partnership with the ground forces.

 As demonstrated above, the Marine Corps has often had to make uncomfortable changes in order to move forward and remain relevant to needs of the nation.  With regard to the location of recruit training, there is no doubt that weighing on the minds of the decision makers is this question: With the need to incorporate new training methods and integrate the Corps, can the current depots accomplish this mission? A big point that one might argue is that San Diego is no longer a tenable location.  One only needs to fly into the airport to realize the constraints that the recruit depot there is under—the city has surrounded the depot.  Recruits at San Diego conduct a great deal of training at Edson Range on Camp Pendleton to the North because the recruit depot is simply unable to accommodate their needs.    

Another thought might be the long-term cost benefits of having as single recruit depot, which are no doubt significant.  It is irrefutable that Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego’s land is valuable.  The Corps must be a good steward of the funds that taxpayers give it, and if there are ways to save money and accomplish the mission of turning men and women into Marines, then they must be considered.  Therefore, echoing the history of consolidation from four to two depots by WWI, maybe it is time for further consolidation into a single recruit depot.  As the consolidation of recruit training in the early 20th century limited irregularities, and produced more uniform Marines each with the same skills and abilities, so could further consolidation create a more hegemonic corps of Marines. 

Using tradition and history in decision making is instructive and sound.  However, using history and tradition to circumnavigate rigorous thinking and extensive discussions to come to a decision is detrimental to the process, and the overall success of the organization.  One must recognize that it is a tradition, in itself, for the Marine Corps to reexamine, reevaluate, adapt and sometimes dramatically change.  Therefore, the decision-making process of the location of recruit depots should not be mired by a strict adherence to history and tradition. As the needs of the nation change, so too must the Marine Corps. Don't let the history and traditions of the Corps hamper it from doing what it must do to survive, from doing what it has always done to survive--change, adapt, innovate, and progress.